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The United Nations has demonstrated that it can effectively
organize and influence international relations in many situations.'
Nevertheless, some states have expressed an intent to change their
policies toward U.N. intervention to reserve their right to use
unilateral military actions in international relations2 States should
reexamine various aspects of unilateral military operations, particu-
larly in relation to the use of force for humanitarian purposes,
because these acts have always been especially controversial? The
possible and concrete parameters of such interventions have been
widely debated.4 Although the United States has advocated the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, a majority of European
international lawyers remains suspicious of unilateral military
actions for humanitarian purposes.5
This Article argues that this skepticism is no longer warranted.
Given the increased attention to human rights and the growing
body of human rights conventions, an outright ban on any forceful
* Associate, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York, New York. J.D.,
Yale Law School; LL.M., Columbia School of Law; LL.D., Moscow Institute of State and
Law; J.S.D., Moscow University; J.D. Hons., Moscow University.
1. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L.
452 (1991).
2. See Douglas Jehl, Clinton Presses U.N. to Increase Its Force at Sarajevo If
Necessary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al.
3. For a bibliography on the subject, see RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 604-06,631-32 (2d ed. 1991).
4. Most theories are summarized in FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 251 (1988); see also NATALINO
RONZITI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND
INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY (1985).
5. See Ulrich Beyerlin, Humanitarian Intervention, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L.
37 (Bernhardt ed., 1987).
365
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
unilateral military action in support of human rights is not
appropriate.
Parts II, III, and IV of this Article discuss the notion of
unilateral military operations for humanitarian purposes and
provide a historical background. Then, in Parts V, VI, and VII,
this Article analyzes the legality of using force to secure a
minimum international standard of human rights. Parts VIII, IX,
X, and XI of this Article outline some guidelines for the use of
force for humanitarian purposes and discuss the possibilities of
abuse and the consequences of humanitarian intervention.
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS
In general, there is no proper way to define the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.6 "[A] usable general definition of
'humanitarian intervention' would be extremely difficult to
formulate and virtually impossible to apply rigorously ....
Nevertheless, a working definition may be useful to outline the
scope of this Article.
Several notions of humanitarian intervention exist. Different
scholars espouse either a broad or narrow definition of humanitari-
an intervention, and these differing approaches sometimes create
confusion.
"Classical" humanitarian intervention' is the unilateral
intervention for protection of another state's nationals from human
rights violations.9 "The theory of intervention on the ground of
humanity is properly that which recognizes the right of one state
to exercise an international control by military force over the acts
of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to
laws of humanity."' Recently, one commentator defined human-
6. Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in
Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 547, n.1
(1987).
7. Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitari-
an Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 277 (1973).
8. In 1921, Ellery Stowell defined humanitarian intervention as "reliance upon force
for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment
which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority
within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice." ELLERY C.
STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1921).
9. See Ulrich Beyerlin, Humanitarian Intervention, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L.
211. 212 (1981).
10. Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 277 (emphasis in original).
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itarian intervention as "the proportionate transboundary help,
including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in
another state who are being denied basic human rights and who
themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their
oppressive government."'1 Some scholars understand humanitari-
an intervention to be a doctrine that deals with the right of states
and international organizations to assist their nationals if they are
subjected to human rights abuses.12
Humanitarian intervention can encompass any kind of
nonforcible state action taken to prevent human rights violations
in another country.13 Sometimes humanitarian intervention is
enlarged, including the use of armed force either for protection of
nationals abroad14 or with respect to rescuing nationals."5 This
type of humanitarian intervention is usually discussed as an aspect
of self-defense.
16
There are also two relatively rare definitions of humanitarian
intervention: intervention by invitation17 and by coercion. Some
authors consider the use of coercion to rescue nationals abroad as
diplomatic protection.'"
This Article addresses only two unilateral military state
actions: (1) classical humanitarian intervention and (2) rescue
operations to protect nationals abroad.
Finally, it is important to note that all previous humanitarian
interventions have been analyzed in some detail.'9 For the
purposes of this Article, there have been no recent humanitarian
11. TESON, supra note 4, at 5.
12. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN A NUTSHELL 117 (1990).
13. Beyerlin, supra note 9, at 212; David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 266 (1992).
14. See Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and US. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 41 (1991); Michael Reisman & Myres S.
McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
15. For example, Reisman and McDougal classify the Israeli rescue mission at
Entebbe, where Israel rescued its nationals, as a lawful humanitarian intervention. See
Myres S. McDougal & Michael Reisman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1976,
at A20.
16. Beyerlin, supra note 9, at 212.
17. ANN VAN WYNEN & A.J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION 91 (1956).
18. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W.M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 868
(1981).
19. See generally TESON, supra note 4, at 251. See also RONZITTI, supra note 4.
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interventions. Therefore, this Article takes a theoretical approach
while referring to some previous works for factual analysis.
III. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNING
One scholar traced the origins of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention to the writings of some ancient theologists, particular-
ly St. Thomas Aquinas, a thirteenth-century religious scholar.
Aquinas argued that a sovereign had the right to intervene "in the
internal affairs of another when the latter mistreats its own
subjects beyond the limits of what seems acceptable."'2
The roots of humanitarian intervention can also be traced to
the "father of international law," Hugo Grotius,21 who declared
that if a tyrant "should inflict upon his subjects such treatment as
no one is warranted in inflicting, the exercise of the right vested in
human society is not precluded."2 When this statement was
made, the notion of human rights had not yet developed, and war
was considered a legitimate means to conduct international
relations. "[Hugo Grotius] told the monarchs of his day that they
were not free to commit crimes and to perpetrate injustice either
intentionally or externally. Tyrannous acts within their own state
associations ... constituted crimes for which these rulers were
liable to punishment. "23 In 1758, Emmerich de Vattel argued: "If
a prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a
lawful cause for resisting him; if, by his insupportable tyranny, he
brings a national revolt against him, any foreign power may
rightfully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its
aid. ,24
20. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 203, 214 (1974). This study contains a very thorough and detailed analysis of the
historical and philosophical roots of this doctrine.
21. See Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 137-43 (1973).
22. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. VII, 1 2, at 584 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., 1925).
23. C. S. EDWARDS, HUGO GROTIUS: THE MIRACLE OF HOLLAND 136 (1981).
24. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDucr AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS
3 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1964).
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IV. PRE-U.N. CHARTER ERA
Only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did
a substantial body of state practice arise, justifying forceful
interventions abroad by alleging the necessity to protect individuals
and groups against their own states.25 Before the U.N. Charter
(the "Charter") was adopted, a number of military missions were
undertaken primarily for humanitarian reasons. For example,
Russia intervened on behalf of Christians in Bulgaria, Turkey,
Bosnia, and Herzegovina in the 1870s, and intervened in the
Balkans during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.26
International lawyers considered this frequent practice to be
legitimate. In particular, in 1905, Oppenheim stated:
[S]hould a State venture to treat its own subjects or a part
thereof with such cruelty as would stagger humanity, public
opinion of the rest of the world would call upon the powers to
exercise intervention for the purpose of compelling such a State
to establish a legal order of things within its boundaries
sufficient to guarantee to its citizens an existence more adequate
to the ideas of modem civilization.27
In 1910, French scholar Antoine Rougier articulated criteria
to determine the legitimacy of using force for humanitarian
ends. 28 In 1915, one professor explicitly stated: "[W]here a state
under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own
citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the
other states of the family of nations are authorized by international
law to intervene on grounds of humanity.,
29
Similarly, missions to rescue nationals held hostage or
otherwise endangered abroad were justified as self-defense.
According to one scholar:
Traditional international law has recognized the right of a state
to employ its armed forces for the protection of the lives and
property of its nationals abroad in situations where the state of
25. Daniel Wolf, Humanitarian Intervention, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 333,
337 (1988).
26. TESON, supra note 4, at 157-58.
27. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (1st ed. 1905).
28. Antoine Rougier, La Theorie de I'Intervention d'Humanitd, 17 REVUE GP-NIeRALE
DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 468 (1910).
29. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTEC'ION OF CmZENS ABROAD 14
(1915).
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their residence, because of revolutionary disturbances or other
reasons, is unable or unwilling to grant them the protection to
which they are entitled. 3°
Such operations complied with classic international law, in which
the presence or absence of three realities determined whether the
resort to force or war was necessary: (1) domestic support for the
action-political reality; (2) anticipated forceful reaction of other
powers-diplomatic reality; and (3) likelihood of the military
operation's success. 31 Classical international law did not absolute-
ly prohibit the use of force.32 In 1922, one commentator empha-
sized that "[i]t always lies within the power of a State ... to gain
political or other advantages over another, not merely by the
employment of force, but also by the direct recourse to war.
33
Many scholars have confirmed this argument. In particular, Judge
Schwebel, in his dissenting opinion in Nicaragua v. United States,
wrote: "In the pre-United Nations Charter era-or, at any rate, in
the pre-Pact of Paris or pre-League of Nations era-states were
free to employ force and go to war for any reason or no rea-
son.,34
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the legality of using
force was gradually called into question. The creation of the
League of Nations was one of the first steps toward regulating
war.3 The Covenant of the League of Nations created two
innovations in international law. First, signatory states were
obligated to use peaceful means to attempt to settle disputes and
could not resort to war without first exhausting those peaceful
means. Second, members of the League of Nations were autho-
rized to judge the legality, under the Covenant, of a state's resort
to war and to apply sanctions against such state if it violated the
Covenant.36 In any case, the relevant provisions of the Covenant
30. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169 (1948).
31. Lee Stuesser, Active Defense: State Military Response to International Terrorism,
17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 4 (1987).
32. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-78 (7th ed. 1952).
33. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 35 (2d ed. 1945).
34. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 259, 362 (Jan. 10)
(separate opinion of Judge Schwebel).
35. See Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 12, in INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
7 (1931).
36. C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 469 (1952).
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"made it very improbable that an aggression-minded state would
ever succeed in resort war without a breach of its obligations
under the Covenant."37 Although the Covenant restricted war,
it did not address lesser forms of armed force,38 in particular the
use of force to rescue nationals endangered abroad.
The 1928 Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand
Pact) explicitly condemned recourse to war to solve international
controversies and renounced war as an instrument of national
policy.3 9 It was the first outright prohibition against the use of
force in modern history. The signing of this Treaty basically
outlawed aggressive wars, but the Treaty did not specifically
prohibit the use of force to defend nationals or for humanitarian
purposes.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was
not universally welcomed. Before World War II, there was a
substantial divergence of opinion among the most prominent
international lawyers.40
V. LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE
The Preamble to the U.N. Charter outlines the U.N. members'
determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war" and "to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in
the common interest.
41
Article 2 of the Charter requires that all members "settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endan-
gered. ' 42  Most importantly, member states agree to a broad
prohibition against use of force: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions. '' 43 These words undoubtedly represent the basic norm of
37. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 408 (6th ed. 1963).
38. ld at 442.
39. See General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 28, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
40. See Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 223.
41. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 3.
43. Id. art. 2, 1i 4.
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contemporary international law with respect to the use of force."
On its face, the scheme is relatively straightforward:
Since the Charter of the United Nations was drafted and
ratified in 1945, the nominal law on the international use of
force has been clear-as law goes, remarkably clear. Its
essential terms can be summarized more easily (and with less
controversy) than most branches of the law of tort or con-
tract.4 5
As is often the case in law, however, even the clearest scheme may
create substantial difficulties and problems in its application and
interpretation.
For example, in drafting the above quoted paragraph, the
word "war" was deliberately omitted, although this word was used
in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1928.46 The term was omitted because states can engage
in hostilities without declaring "war" or calling it "war;" "force" is
a broader term, which encompasses most military actions.
47
The language of Article 2 has been subject to various
interpretations.' Paragraph 4 of Article 2 prohibits the use of
"force against the territorial integrity or political independence" of
another nation.49 At Dumbarton Oaks, the accepted language
restricted "the use or threat of force in their international relations
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organiza-
tion."5 The words "against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state" 51 were added to the Charter at the
insistence of smaller countries that wanted some assurance that the
more powerful states could not use force at the expense of weaker
states. 2 The late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote, "territorial
integrity, especially where coupled with 'political independence,'
44. Edward Gordon et al., International Law and U.S. Action in Grenada (Special
Report), 18 INT'L LAW. 331, 356 (1984).
45. Eugene Rostow, The Politics of Force, 24 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 38, 58 (1982).
46. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 43-60 (3d ed.
1969).
47. Oscar Schachter, General Course in Public International Law, 178 RECUEIL DES
COURS 138 (1982).
48. Gordon, supra note 44, at 356.
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4.
50. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, ch. II, 1 4.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
52. See Doc. 442, 111/3/20, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 342-46 (1945); GOODRICH ET AL.,
supra note 46, at 44-45.
372 [Vol. 17:365
Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons
is synonymous with territorial inviolability. 5 3 On the other hand,
it has been argued that the meaning of "force against the territori-
al integrity or political independence," as was known to the 1945
drafters, is technical and does not encompass all uses of force.
54
VI. EVOLVING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The recent, post-Charter trends in the development of interna-
tional law require analysis. Such principles as sovereignty, non-
intervention, and respect for human rights are particularly
important in exploring the legality of humanitarian intervention
and rescue missions.
One of the main principles of international law is the principle
of state sovereignty. For centuries, sovereignty identified the
nation-state as the legitimate actor entitled to international law
protection."
State sovereignty is the state's supremacy over its territory and
its independence in international relations.5 7 Such independence,
however, cannot be understood as an absolute, entirely unbounded
principle. Unlimited state power manifests itself in the absence of
higher authority over the state when the state is not subordinated
to the authority of other governments.
Sovereignty is a characteristic of state power, inseparably
linked to concrete historical conditions.58 Thus, the notion of state
sovereignty cannot remain unchanged.5 - The measure of a state's
sovereign rights at the beginning and end of the twentieth century
differs widely. Early in the century, there were fewer multilateral
treaties and international organizations. Therefore, states had
fewer obligations. "A major intellectual requirement of our time
is to rethink the question of sovereignty-not to weaken its
essence, which is crucial to international security and cooperation,
53. OPPENHEIM, supra note 32, at 154.
54. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 57-73
(1987).
55. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (6th ed.
1990).
56. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 866-69 (1990).
57. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (G. Tunkin ed., 1986).
58. The national premise of sovereignty has been changing because "the pieces on the
global chess board are changing." Scheffer, supra note 13, at 260.
59. Reisman, supra note 56, at 869.
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but to recognize that it mau, take more than one form and perform
more than one function."
Some objective factors, such as the general development of
international affairs and interdependence, are also changing
matters essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction. Human
rights are the best examples of diminishing respect for sovereignty.
Such rights traditionally fell within the exclusive internal compe-
tence of states and were not regulated by international law.
Therefore, human rights were deemed matters exclusively within
each state's domestic jurisdiction.61 Despite some noticeable
changes in international law, in 1986, the Soviet concept of
international law still provided that human rights would remain
"primarily an internal affair of States."'62
Arguably, human rights are no longer regarded as solely an
internal state matter.63 It is now difficult to support the conten-
tion that internal human rights are "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state," insulated from international law.' On
par with the development of international cooperation and
reinforcement of world interdependence, citizens' rights and
freedoms have transcended the borders of one state, gradually
becoming common property. Thus, human rights are not ipso
facto a matter within each state's domestic jurisdiction.6" Rather,
these rights are acquiring an international tinge. Through the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,
the Covenants of Human Rights in 1966, the European Convention
of Human Rights in 1950, the Helsinki Accords in 1975, and the
Copenhagen Declaration, human rights became a stronger basis
upon which to challenge the preeminence of state sovereignty.66
The International Court of Justice recognized that respecting
human rights is an obligation ergo omnes, similar to the obligation
60. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 89, 99
(Winter 1992/93).
61. See BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supra note 12, at 127.
62. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 57, at 353.
63. Even Russian scholars have recognized that human rights are no longer exclusively
within domestic jurisdiction. Vladlen Vereshetin & Rein Mullerson, New Mentality and
International Law, 3 SOVIET ST. & L. (1988).
64. Reisman, supra note 56, at 869.
65. BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supra note 12, at 127.
66. Id. at 127-28.
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to refrain from acts of genocide or aggression.67 Furthermore,
contemporary international law does not prohibit such intru-
sions.68
In a similar fashion, a new understanding of the principle of
nonintervention arises when some matters, such as human rights,
become the subject of international agreements. These agreements
place human rights outside the state's exclusive domestic jurisdic-
tion, making them a concern of the world community. Then-U.N.
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar stated in his annual report: "It
is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-intervention with
the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as
a protective barrier behind which human rights could not massively
or systematically be violated with impunity."'69 This additional
argument does not automatically give a state the right to use force
for humanitarian purposes. Nevertheless, it provides additional
support for humanitarian intervention.
Thus, the correlation between international prerogatives and
the realm of inter-state regulation is changing. Numerous problems
have left the bounds of domestic jurisdiction to become world
community problems. This position does not violate the principle
of sovereignty because states have voluntarily submitted interna-
tional affairs issues to international regulation. This grant of
power exists in conjunction with the principle of sovereignty rather
than in spite of it. Moreover, legally proper agreements, in
accordance with which mutual obligations are undertaken and
definite legal authority is transferred to an international organiza-
tion, serve to strengthen sovereignty.
By joining organizations and treaties, a state limits its
authority but simultaneously acquires new benefits. Consequently,
depriving states of certain rights and privileges should not be
regarded negatively. Any international agreement or organization
grants its members new rights, opportunities, privileges, and
prerogatives. Thus, the term "limitation of sovereignty" is
conditional. General human and national interests are connected,
achieving a unified position.
67. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 21 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977).
68. Id
69. JAVIER PREZ DE CUELLAR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION 12 (1991).
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VII. THE LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE FOR
HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES
A. Rescuing Nationals Abroad
The late Judge Lauterpacht noted an obvious contradiction
between domestic and international law. "[T]he individual in his
capacity as an alien enjoys a larger measure of protection by
international law than in his character as the citizen of his own
State."7° Under traditional international law, this inconsistency
was permitted because states were obligated to treat aliens
according to international law principles but were not required to
treat their own nationals properly. Where a foreign state violated
the minimum standard of treatment accorded to aliens, the aliens'
state was justified under traditional international law to use force
in self-defense to protect its nationals.71
After the U.N. Charter, the legal regime changed. As noted,
contemporary international law prohibits the use or the threat of
force. The right of self-defense is the one express exception to this
general prohibition.72  If necessary, the Security Council is
empowered to use military measures.7" Moreover, force may also
be used against former enemy states74 and by regional arrange-
ments.
75
It should be noted that neither the Covenant of the League of
Nations nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact referred explicitly to this right
of self-defense, which has been accepted in international law for
centuries. In proposing the Pact, however, the French and U.S.
governments expressed the view that a right of self-defense "is
inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty.,
76
The United States asserted the following:
70. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 121 (1950).
71. OPPENHEIM, supra note 27, at 300.
72. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
73. Id. art. 42.
74. Id. art. 107.
75. See id. arts. 52-54.
76. H.R. Doc. No. 639, 70th Cong., 2d. Sess. 36 (1928).
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Every state is free at all times and regardless of treaty provi-
sions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone
is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse
to war in self-defense. If it is a good case, the world will
applaud and not condemn its action.'
By contrast, the U.N. Charter takes a different approach:
The U.N. Charter explicitly mentions and preserves this permis-
sion to resort to force in response to unauthorized coercion,
describes it as an "inherent right," and recognizes that permissi-
ble coercion may be exercised by the target state individually,
or by a collectivity of states, without prior authorization from
the organized community (although, of course, subject to its
subsequent appraisal).
Because the main exception to the general prohibition against
using force is self-defense, which is triggered only if there has been
an attack on the state, the first question is whether the use of force
against one's nationals abroad may be regarded as an attack
against a state.
It is plausible that attacking nationals is an attack on the state.
Using the theory of social contract between a state and an
individual, it has been argued that:
[A]n injury to the nationals of a state constitutes an injury to
the state itself, and that the protection of nationals is an
essential function of the state. On this reasoning it is feasible
to argue that the defense of nationals, whether within or
without the territorial jurisdiction of the state, is in effect the
defense of the state itself.
79
Because population is an essential ingredient of a state,80
whether the individuals are within or outside of the state's territory
is insignificant."1 It may have important practical consequences
and may require different solutions, but as a matter of law, it
77. Id.
78. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 126
(1961).
79. DEREK W. BOwETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (1958).
80. Derek W. Bowett, The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, in THE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE (A. Cassese ed., 1986).
81. But see LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 145 (2d ed. 1979). Louis Henkin
does not consider an armed attack against the nationals located in a foreign state as an
armed attack against the nationals' state. Id.
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should be considered an attack upon a state giving rise to a right
of self-defense.u
Cases of this form of armed intervention have not been infre-
quent in the past and, where not attended by suspicions of being
a pretext for political pressure, have generally been regarded as
justified by the sheer necessity of instant action to save the lives
of innocent nationals, whom the local government is unable or
unwilling to protect.'
U.N. Charter Article 51 does not mention any specific restric-
tions. Its sole requirement for exemption is an armed attack
"against a Member of the United Nations."' . There is no
guidance as to where such attack must occur or how large the
attack must be. Obviously, the murder of some German tourists
in Miami is doubtful justification for the use of force in self-
defense, but this example emphasizes the importance of taking a
balanced approach to the problem." Although there are no
requirements or restrictions with respect to defense of nationals
abroad, the danger is substantial. One commentator noted the
following:
[T]o imperil the safety of a single national abroad is not to
imperil the security of the state; and yet there may be occasions
when the threat of danger is great enough, or wide enough in
its application to a sizable community abroad, for it to be
legitimately construed as an attack on the state itself.
An assessment of state practice supports the argument
favoring a right to use force to protect nationals abroad. In
general, developed countries espouse this approach. As noted, the
United States supports a right of self-defense in such circum-
stances. The United Kingdom shares this view. The Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs informed the House
of Commons on October 26, 1993:
We would not dispute that a state has the right in international
law to take appropriate action to safeguard the lives of its
citizens where there has been a breakdown of law and order,
82. Stuesser, supra note 31, at 30-31.
83. Waldock, supra note 36, at 467.
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
85. For an analysis of the balancing test, see infra Part VII.B.
86. BowETr, supra note 79, at 93.
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nor that there is any provision in the Charter of the United
Nations that makes it unlawful to take such action8
Interestingly enough, these similar legal positions did not prevent
the United Kingdom from taking a different view during the
Grenada invasion.8 This inconsistency demonstrates that general
similarity in legal positions does not necessarily warrant the same
assessment of particular situations.
In the past, socialist countries regarded intervention to protect
nationals abroad as unlawful.8 9 Some developing countries have
also adhered to this view; however, one should consider that
during the Cold War the so-called "domino" effect often played
socialist and western countries against each other. Virtually any
country's military action would have immediately evoked the most
vigorous criticism from countries of another block. Likewise, these
countries would later try to even the score. Therefore, despite the
fact that states' practices are generally important in assessing
international norms, states' declarations during the Cold War
varied dramatically from their actions and did not certify their true
legal positions.
In this regard, it is significant that Russia modified its position.
Until recently, the Soviet Union explicitly opposed any use of
force to protect nationals abroad. In fact, the 1950 draft of the
Soviet Union's Definition of Aggression expressly prohibited such
protection.9' This draft listed acts of aggression and a series of
motives that could not be valid excuses for launching an act of
aggression. "[A]ny danger which may threaten the life or property
of aliens" was one such motive. 91 Some other countries, particu-
larly the United Kingdom and Belgium, criticized this position:'
"[B]y mistreating foreigners in its own territory a State committed
an act of aggression against the country of which the foreigners
were nationals; and in defending itself, the State concerned was
exercising its right of self-defence." 93
87. W. C. GILMORE, THE GRENADA INTERVENTION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTA-
TION 61 (1984).
88. Id
89. Id at 58.
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The Soviet Union's historical position is contrary to Russia's
current position. Russia has officially welcomed the use of force
to protect its nationals.94 The shift in Russia's stance is obviously
important because Russia and China were previously the only
Security Council permanent members vigorously opposed to use
of force to protect nationals abroad. Russia's change in position
manifests the growing acceptance of the right to use such force in
the world community. This recognition may prevent potential
wrongdoers from endangering foreigners' lives and may make
military interference possible.
Although the right to rescue nationals is part of self-defense
and is, therefore, legitimate, it should be emphasized that a state
has discretion to decide whether to use force. Accordingly,
guidelines should be established to clarify the circumstances in
which use of force is justified.
B. Humanitarian Intervention
Using humanitarian intervention as a justification for the use
of force is trickier and, candidly, less persuasive. Obviously, large-
scale atrocities against the population of another state cannot
reasonably be construed as self-defense. "[I]t seems impossible, in
the absence of the link of nationality, to regard [humanitarian
intervention] as a species of self-defense .. . ."' Therefore, other
justifications should be made.
The legality of humanitarian intervention should be appraised
in light of the international human rights norms that have trans-
formed dramatically over the last fifty years. Today, these norms
impose much stronger obligations upon states to treat their
nationals in accordance with international standards.' Several
norms are aimed at safeguarding human rights. The Preamble of
the U.N. Charter expresses the people's determination "to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity of and worth of
the human person," and a dedication "to ensure, by the acceptance
of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall
94. Riga's Authorities Deport Two Russian Generals, RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., Jan. 11,
1994, at 1.
95. Derek W. Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense,
in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 38, 44 (J.N. Moore ed., 1974).
96. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in TWENTY-
FOUR HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS 18-30 (1992).
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not be used, save in the common interest."'  These provisions
are frequently considered to legally justify or at least encourage
humanitarian interventions.98  Proponents of humanitarian
interventions argue that these provisions of the Preamble, along
with Articles 1, 55, and 56, create a positive obligation for member
states' action defending human rights.99 They assert that, under
the Charter, human rights protections should be accorded the same
weight as the maintenance of international peace." "The
repeated emphasis upon the common interest in human rights
indicates that the use of force for the urgent protection of such
rights is no less authorized than other forms of self-help.""1 '
As noted, after the advent of the U.N., a substantial body of
human rights conventions was adopted, exposing participating
states to international scrutiny and imposing severe obligations. In
particular, the Genocide Convention not only makes genocide an
international crime, but authorizes its signatories to "undertake
[efforts] to prevent and to punish" acts of genocide.1" More-
over, in 1951, the International Court of Justice stated that "the
principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without
any conventional obligation.""°3 In other words, notwithstanding
Convention participation, states have an obligation not to commit
acts of genocide.
In another important decision, the Court specifically stated
that, due to the importance of human rights, "all states can be held
to have a legal interest in their protection."" The Court speci-
fied that "such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary
international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic
97. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
98. See MYRES S. MCDoUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
241 (1980).
99. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55, 56. These Articles reaffirm the U.N.'s commitment to
promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all. See id.
100. See LILLICH, supra note 3, at 603-04.
101. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 14, at 172.
102. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 1951 I.CJ. 15, 24.
103. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
104. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (BeIg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 134 (second phase).
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rights of human person, including protection from slavery and
racial discrimination."' 5  This decision arguably has subjected
states to international scrutiny and exposed them to the possibility
of external pressure in the event of a violation;1°6 however, the
International Court of Justice's remedy for a violation was for
avenging states to bring the wrongdoing states into court, rather
than to wage war, no matter how briefly."°  Nevertheless,
humanitarian intervention may be justified as protecting basic
human rights because such action is not waging war.10 8  Where
human rights are egregiously violated, a state should consider two
conflicting obligations: the obligation to protect nationals abroad
and the obligation to avoid the threat and use of force in interna-
tional relations."° If the values embodied in the obligation to
protect human rights outweigh those embraced in the obligation to
refrain from using force, then a state may interfere to prevent
human rights abuses.10°
Additional arguments have been made in support of humani-
tarian intervention. As noted, humanitarian interventions were
permitted under traditional international law."'
The advent of the United Nations neither terminated nor
weakened the customary institution of.humanitarian interven-
tion. In terms of its substantive marrow, the Charter strength-
ened and extended humanitarian intervention, in that it con-
firmed the homocentric character of international law and set in
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Some authors disagree with this argument. Natalino Ronzitti stated that: "while
it is quite sure that the obligation to refrain from the use of force is embodied in a
peremptory norm of international law, it is not at all sure that the duty to promote human
rights is set forth in a jus cogens rule." RONzITrl, supra note 4, at 15.
107. 1970 I.C.J. at 4.
108. Theodor Schweisfurth raised similar arguments with regard to rescue operations.
See Theodor Schweisfurth, Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Use
of Force in Relation to the Protection of Human Rights, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 159, 163
(1980).
109. Id.
110. Theodor Schweisfurth's approach is a balancing test. He rejects a broad
interpretation of the words "armed attack" in U.N. Charter Article 51, and argues strongly
against waiving the ordinary meaning of these words. In this manner he justified rescue
operations as protecting basic human rights. According to Schweisfurth, "it is more
convincing when the State of nationality bases its rescue action on an obligation which
aims at the protection of high values such as human rights than when it bases it on a right
so widely contested." Id.
111. See Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 203-07.
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motion a continuous authoritative process of articulating
international human rights ....
Even a literal reading of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter does
not indicate an absolute prohibition on the use of force.' 13 It
only prohibits using force "against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." '114 If the
use of force is employed consistently. with other principles of the
U.N. Charter without being directed against territorial integrity or
political independence, it "may be commendable rather than
necessarily forbidden by the Charter." ' 5 Therefore, if the force
is employed for a legitimate purpose, such as to put an end to
human rights abuses, it conforms with the U.N. Charter's funda-
mental principles.'16
Many scholars have stated that the U.N.'s inefficiency and its
failure to respond effectively to human rights deprivations justify
humanitarian intervention."' An apparent objective of the U.N.
founders was to create a mechanism that would provide for
collective, rather than individual, responses to acts of aggression.
The possible U.N. limitations became obvious soon after its
advent. In 1948, it was argued for the first time that, under certain
conditions, unilateral actions should be substituted for collective
measures.
118
It would seem that the only possible argument against the
substitution of collective measures under the Security Council
for individual measures by a single state would be the inability
of the international organization to act with the speed requisite
to preserve life. It may take time before the Security Council,
with its Military Staff Committee, and the pledged national
contingents are in a state of readiness to act in such cases, but
the Charter contemplates that international actions shall be
timely as well as powerful. 19
112. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 14, at 171.
113. McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 98, at 241.
114. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4.
115. See JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 43 (1958).
116. See Reisman & McDougal, supra note 14, at 177.
117. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE
U.N. DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN Do ABOUT IT (1985).
118. JESSUP, supra note 30, at 169.
119. Id. at 170-71.
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In other words, where the U.N. leaves a gap that cannot be
replaced by lawful action other than the unilateral use of force,
states are not obligated to refrain from using force under the U.N.
Charter. 2 ' "To give up the right of self-help without obtaining
any other adequate means of redress would simply have played
into the hands of law-breakers.,
121
Unilateral use of force is not the best justification for humani-
tarian intervention because it implies some kind of illegality. It
also suggests that humanitarian intervention is legitimate only to
the extent that the United Nations is impotent and lacking in
goodwill between its members. Humanitarian intervention may be
tracked to ancient times and should not be justified solely through
the inadequacy of collective measures. The logic of this argument,
however, is still useful in structuring the criteria for humanitarian
intervention.
[T]he establishment of machinery for collective security and
enforcement was so basic a condition for the Members of the
United Nations in surrendering their right under customary
international law to use force for a variety of reasons, that
failure by the Organization to create this machinery would
partially relieve the Member States of their obligation of
restraint under the Charter."2
Moreover, the growing body of rules compels states to use their
best efforts to enhance human rights and protect them from
violations.
The Soviet Union's position was to use the U.N. mechanism
to cure human rights violations.123 Even this mechanism was
used only if there was a threat to or breach of the peace.'24
Article VIII of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide provides that any Contracting
Party may call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United
Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
suppression of the act of genocide . ... [R]esponse of the
120. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 98, at 241.
121. Waldock, supra note 36, at 468.
122. Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 257.
123. Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND
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world community to violations of basic human rights and
freedoms may manifest itself in various forms. However, it
should be taken into account that measures employed must
completely exclude humanitarian intervention involving the use
of armed force if it is not appropriately authorized by the
Security Council."2
As will be outlined later, the use of force should be the last
resort, and collective measures are preferable to unilateral actions;
if the collective machinery does not work, however, should the
state be forced to leave victims without relief and allow the
wrongdoer to continue? The obvious injustice of this proposition
provides a basis for resorting to humanitarian intervention in
exceptional circumstances where there is international consen-
sus.126 Such consensus presupposes that the international com-
munity acknowledges gross human rights violations and regards
such humanitarian intervention with favor.
Although there has not been unanimity with respect to the
customary norm of humanitarian intervention,127 there have been
a number12 of precedents 9 leading to the conclusion that
states are willing to use military force in extraordinary circum-
stances. Interestingly enough, several industrial countries' official
positions may be interpreted to partially espouse the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. In 1983, Davis R. Robinson, Legal
Adviser of the U.S. State Department, justifying U.S. action in
Grenada, declared that the United States "did not assert a broad
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.' 130  Nevertheless, this
language should not be construed to mean that the United States
rejected the doctrine per se. In 1946, the United Kingdom's
position was as follows: "[T]he right of humanitarian intervention,
in the name of the Rights of Man trampled upon by the State in
125. Id.
126. Theodor Meron, Commentary on Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 123, at 214.
127. See id.
128. Some scholars differ on this point. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Human Rights,
Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality and Politics, 37 J.
INT'L AFF. 317 (1984) ("[A] single case of action every decade or two, in the face of
literally dozens of instances of inaction, in no way establishes humanitarian intervention
as state practice.").
129. See, e.g., TES6N, supra note 4, at 155-200; RONZITrI, supra note 4, at 50.
130. Davis R. Robinson, Letter From the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 18
INT'L LAW. 381, 386 (1984).
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a manner offensive to the feeling of Humanity, has been recog-
nized long ago as an integral part of the Law of Nations.'' 131 On
the other hand, a special study in the United Kingdom stated:
[The] overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion
comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian
intervention, for three main reasons: First, the U.N. Charter and
the corpus of modem international law do not seem specifically
to incorporate such a right; secondly, state practice in the past
two centuries, and especially since 1945, at best provides only
a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian intervention, and, on
most assessments, none at all; and finally, on prudential
grounds, that the scope for abusing such a right argues strongly
against its creation.
132
During various U.N. discussions, humanitarian intervention
has not received substantial support, 33 although some states have
acknowledged it. At the Ninth Session of the Sixth Committee,
the Dutch representative said that "force could be lawfully used to
prevent 'the massacre in a foreign State of persons with whom we
feel related for reasons of nationality.' ' 134  According to the
Dutch representative, "the use of armed force could be justified in
the case of 'force majeure,' which is a general principle of law
recognized by civilized nations.,
135
Sometimes the use of force in cases of human rights atrocities
can be morally justified.136 For example, Professor D'Amato
argues:
Human rights law demands intervention against tyranny ....
I do not argue that intervention is justified to establish democ-
racy, aristocracy, socialism, communism or any other. forms of
government. But if any of these forms of government become
131. Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 226 (quoting H. SHAWCROSS, ExPOSt INTRODUCTIF
AU PRoCPs DE NUREMBERG (1946)).
132. 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 614 (1986).
133. RONzIrrTI, supra note 4, at 106.
134. Id at 50.
135. Id.
136. But see Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 249-50. Fonteyne denies this moral argument.
This could only encourage States to run the risk, break the law, invoke some
vague, plausible higher motive, and hope that the world community will fail to
censor their conduct. In the long run such a situation must inevitably lead to an
increasing authority deflation of international law in general, and of the Charter
in particular. If States can 'acceptably' break the law for humanitarian reasons,
why should it not be equally tolerable to violate it for other, perhaps morally less
commendable motives as well?
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in the Aristotelian sense corrupted, resulting in tyranny against
their populations... I believe that intervention from outside is
not only legally justified but morally required.137
In sum, all of the foregoing arguments are relatively fragile;
however, the increasing body of human rights and growing number
of binding legal obligations on states with respect to human rights
create a situation where humanitarian intervention may be justified
in extreme circumstances.
131
VIII. CRITERIA FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
After discussing the history and legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention, it is possible to conclude that the doctrine has a
substantial basis in international law and may be used in extreme
circumstances; the basic issue, however, is which circumstances
should trigger humanitarian intervention. Obviously, international
relations are too complicated to determine specific criteria for the
application of humanitarian intervention in all circumstances.
Nevertheless, some working standards may be formulated if
humanitarian intervention is to exist in international law.
1 39
Such guidelines would be helpful for at least two reasons. First,
specific criteria would aid in drawing the proper lines between
genuine humanitarian intervention and its abuses. Second, clearly
articulated standards should deter governments from violating their
citizens' rights1" and from abusing the right to humanitarian
intervention.
Different arguments have been advanced to justify using force
to rescue or protect nationals abroad: (1) an emergency need to
save lives, (2) legitimate self-defense, and (3) non-derogation of
territorial integrity and political independence of the state in
whose territory the action occurred.141 A classical study of the
use of force enumerated three conditions under which a state may
use force abroad in self-defense to protect its nationals. "There
must be (1) an imminent threat of injury to nationals, (2) a failure
or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them
and (3) measures of protection strictly confined to the object of
137. D'Amato, supra note 54, at 59.
138. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 98, at 241.
139. Bazyler, supra note 6, at 598.
140. It.
141. Schachter, supra note 47, at 145.
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protecting them against injury."' 42 Similarly, other criteria have
been suggested to determine the legality of humanitarian interven-
143tion.
The intervening states have invoked different arguments to
support their actions. For example, in 1976, the Israeli delegate to
the United Nations, justifying the Entebbe raid, stated that the
Israeli action was self-defense for which they had "no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation."'" He also emphasized
that the Israeli government only employed the amount of force
strictly necessary to rescue its citizens.145
In suggesting criteria for using force for humanitarian
purposes, one may conclude that many such standards should be
similar to the criteria for using force in international relations.
Obviously, this conclusion is not surprising because the same
standards should govern any use of force in international relations.
Additional criteria may be added as particular uses of force may
warrant.
A. Threat to Lives and Large-Scale Atrocities
What constitutes "an emergency need to save lives" justifying
the use of force?1" It is easier to justify the use of force when
a situation has become violent and there is an imminent threat to
nationals' lives. In 1956, the United Kingdom sought to justify the
Anglo-French invasion of the Suez in this manner.4 7  The Lord
Chancellor informed the House of Lords that "self-defence
undoubtedly includes a situation in which the lives of a State's
142. Waldock, supra note 36, at 467.
143. Summarizing the works of Richard B. Lillich and John Bassett Moore, John R.
D'Angelo outlined the following factors:
(1) the immediacy of the human rights violation;
(2) the extent of the violation of human rights;
(3) an invitation from an appropriate authority to use forcible self-help;
(4) the degree of coercive measures employed;
(5) the relative disinterestedness of the intervening State;
(6) minimal effect on authority structure;
(7) prompt disengagement consistent with the purposes of the action; and
(8) immediate full reporting to the Security Council and appropriate regional organizations.
John R. D'Angelo, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue Mission
to Iran and Its Legality Under International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 497 (1981).
144. See RONzITri, supra note 4, at 55.
145. Id
146. Waldock, supra note 36, at 467.
147. GILMORE, supra note 87, at 61.
388 [Vol. 17:365
Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons
nationals abroad are threatened and it is necessary to intervene on
that territory for their protection . . . . " In such a situation,
the state may choose between repatriating its nationals or using
force to save them. The decision depends on many circumstances.
Generally, a peaceful solution is preferable. 4 9 In some instances,
however, using force is the state's only alternative. The Israeli
rescue action in Entebbe, Uganda, was the most evident example
of state action when citizens' lives were in danger' 5° It was clear
that Israeli lives were in peril and the Ugandan government had
done nothing to protect or rescue them. In these circumstances,
using force to rescue these citizens was both legitimate and
justifiable.1 51  The U.S. position was stated in the following
manner:
Israel's action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a
temporary breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda.
Normally such a breach would be impermissible under the
Charter of the United Nations. However, there is a well-
established right to use limited force to protect one's own
nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death where the
state in whose territory they are located either is unwilling or
unable to protect them.'52
When the threat to human lives is imminent a state may use
force, but there are many situations when the threat is not so
obvious. For example, should a state be permitted to use force
when there is substantial evidence of imminent danger to nation-
als? In other words, should a state be allowed to use force in
anticipation of attack against its citizens? The answer has
substantial practical effect because armed force is frequently used
in the absence of an attack on nationals. This practice has given
rise to much controversy among international lawyers.153  In
1842, then-Secretary of State Webster utilized a formula, relating
to the Caroline incident. 1" This formula has been cited as an
148. Id at 56.
149. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1631 (1984).
150. See Leslie C. Green, Rescue at Entebbe-Legal Aspects, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM.
RTS. 312, 313 (1976); see also RONzrIrl, supra note 4, at 37.
151. See McDougal & Reisman, supra note 15.
152. Protection of Human Rights, 1976 DIG. § 6, at 150-51.
153. Schachter, supra note 47, at 150.
154. See John Bassett Moore, Destruction of the Caroline, 2 DIG. INT'L L. 412 (1906);
see also R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 87 (1938).
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example of anticipatory self-defense, although it is quite controver-
sial and not endorsed unanimously.l5 The British claimed they
had a legal right to attack a vessel, the Caroline, on the U.S. side
of the Niagara River in 1837 because the ship carried armed
personnel to support an uprising in Canada.5 6 Webster required
the British government to show that the "necessity of that self-
defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation.', 117 It also had to show that the
Canadian authorities did nothing unreasonable or excessive
because the necessity of the self-defense limits the acts that are
justifiable.5 8
This formulation of self-defense is often cited as authoritative
customary international law.159 During the Security Council
debates on the legality of the Israeli bombing of a nuclear reactor
in Iraq, some delegates referred to the Webster formulation of the
right of anticipatory self-defense as an accepted norm of interna-
tional law, validating the right to use armed force in self-defense
prior to an actual attack only where such attack is imminent with
no time for negotiation."
Regardless of different interpretations and controversial state
practice, it is hard to deny the right to anticipatory self-defense in
a nuclear age, which would require states to wait passively for their
fate. 161 In 1946, the U.S. government offered a new interpreta-
tion of armed attack, entirely different from that which existed
prior to the invention of nuclear weapons. It encompassed the
dropping of an atomic bomb as well as "certain steps in themselves
preliminary to such action. '1 62 These steps are also required for
conventional warfare.' 6 It can be argued that an armed attack
155. Id. at 412.
156. See id
157. Id at 412.
158. Id.
159. Some international law scholars explicitly deny anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g.,
Ian Brownlie, The Principle of Non- Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in
THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (W.E. Butler ed., 1989);
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 70, at 156; Henkin, supra note 14, at 41.
160. See Schachter, supra note 47, at 152.
161. See HENKIN, supra note 81, at 141.
162. Gordon, supra note 44, at 369; JESSUP, supra note 30, at 166-67 (both quoting U.S.
Memorandum No. 3).
163. Rosalyn Higgins, General Course of Public International Law, 230 RECUEIL DES
COURS DES L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 310 (1992).
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on nationals abroad does not necessarily imperil a state's exis-
tence.16( Ultimately, however, a state's fate is linked directly to
its citizens' welfare.65
It is possible that anticipatory self-defense could become a
pretext for interventions and gross international law violations.'"
The potential for abuse, however, arises with respect to any rights
available to a state. Similarly, a right to self-defense in national
law is subject to individual abuse, but this hardly justifies complete
denial of this right.
Large-scale atrocities are the first prerequisite for humanitari-
an intervention. 67  The target state's government should be
involved in killing, torturing, or creating conditions of intolerable
suffering for large numbers of its own citizens. Because the right
to life is a fundamental human right, the international community
should not condone its violation.
This prerequisite raises the issue of what should be considered
as massive killing or large-scale atrocity. The most obvious answer
is that it should be a question of fact to be determined according
to particular circumstances. The murder of one person is hardly
a reason for humanitarian intervention, though human losses
should not have to amount to millions to justify intervention.
Without a doubt, any government practicing genocide may be a
target of humanitarian intervention." Interestingly enough, the
Genocide Convention does not specify the number or percentage
of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group that must be killed
to constitute genocide.1 69 If any additional information is need-
ed, it is incumbent upon the intervening state to acquire such
information before deciding to intervene.
164. Ian Brownlie contends that the phrase "armed attack" "strongly suggests a
trespass." IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 278
(1963).
165. See id.
166. The International Court of Justice observed that a right to use force "in the cause
of justice" would be "reserved for the most powerful states and might easily lead to
perverting the administration of justice itself .... [A] policy of force such as [this] has in
the past given rise to most serious abuses and ... cannot, whatever be the defects in
international organization, find a place in international law." Corfu Channel Case (U.K.
v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35.
167. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 96, art. 6 at 19-20.
168. See Bazyler, supra note 6, at 600.
169. Id
19951
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Some scholars propose a balancing approach that would
involve weighing "the amount of destruction which almost inevita-
bly will be caused by armed intervention, and the importance of
the human rights sought to be protected."'17  Others have
argued for humanitarian intervention not only in cases of "geno-
cide, enslavement, or mass murder, but also to put an end to
situations of serious 'ordinary' oppression."' 71  This approach,
however, gives too much latitude to states, providing them with
unlimited power to employ force in every incident violating human
rights.
Although every human rights abuse is a violation of interna-
tional law, it does not necessarily require the use of force.
International law provides numerous alternative methods, such as
diplomatic protests, public condemnations, and various sanctions.
The response should match the abuse, and interventions should
not be allowed for small-scale abuses.
1 72
Is anticipatory humanitarian intervention permissible? Is it
possible to draw a parallel with rescue operations to save nationals
abroad? As noted, an argument has been made in favor of
anticipatory use of force to protect nationals, but humanitarian
intervention is definitely more unusual and should be considered
with more care. The intervening state should have very clear
evidence of atrocities. By only alleging the possibility or immi-
nence of massacre, the intervening state does not have a substan-
tial basis for invasion. Allowing states to intervene in the event of
merely potential atrocities would create enormous risk of abuse.
The intervening state would become not only a judge or arbitrator,
but a supervisor that could dictate how to proceed. Even if the
intervening state crosses the line, its action may be partially
warranted in the event of ongoing abuses but is unlikely to be
justified where atrocities are merely pending.
Humanitarian intervention is a remedy of last resort to be
used only in situations of apparent and current massacre or other
serious human rights abuses, after exhausting all other remedies.
The intervening state should attempt all possible peaceful
procedures before resorting to force.
170. Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 258-59.
171. TESON, supra note 4, at 15.
172. See Bazyler, supra note 6, at 600.
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In some circumstances, resort to other options may be useless.
The intervening state may use force to stop atrocities when it is
apparent that no other remedy is available or efficient. For
example, where the atrocities will proceed with such speed that
any delay-even informing the United Nations-may bring
tremendous casualties, it is conceivable that the intervening state
may immediately intervene and use force for humanitarian
ends.173
B. Necessity
No state should resort to armed force unless absolutely
necessary. "Necessity comprises at least two elements: (1) the
existence of a danger, and (2) the nonexistence of reasonable
peaceful alternatives." '174 Using Webster's formula, in the con-
text of the Caroline case,
[i]t must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the
persons on board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have
been unavailing; it must be shown that daylight could not be
waited for; that there could be no attempt at discrimination
between the innocent and the guilty; that it would not have
been enough to seize and detain the vessel; but that there was
a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her in darkness
of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed
men were asleep on board, killing some and wounding others,
and then drawing her into the current, above the cataract,
setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there might
not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the
dead, committing her to a fate which fills the imagination with
horror.'75
At first glance, the danger requirement seems self-explanatory.
As soon as danger is present, a state is free to exercise its right to
self-defense. In other words, when an armed attack occurs, armed
force may be used to rebut that attack. No future justification is
necessary to warrant any action taken in self-defense; 17 6 however,
particular cases can be more complicated. The international
community is generally skeptical of any use of force. The necessity
of using force is questioned especially when such action is an
173. See id. at 607.
174. Stuesser, supra note 31, at 31.
175. Moore, supra note 154, at 414 (emphasis added).
176. Schachter, supra note 47, at 153.
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anticipatory use of force or the threat to nationals' lives is
longstanding.
The presence of danger is closely related to the justifiability
of armed attack. As soon as an attack is imminent, the necessity
for force is justified. Particular circumstances may raise additional
questions, but as a matter of principle, an imminent attack
warrants the use of force in self-defense.
The continuity of threat raises another issue. When a threat
is impending, a state may use force to defend its nationals. Does
the state still possess this right if it is not exercised without delay?
The rescue mission in Iran illustrates this problem. On
November 4, 1979, fifty-two people were seized and held hostage
at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Soon thereafter, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 457, condemning the capture as illegal
and calling for the immediate release of the hostages.17  Several
days later, the Security Council reiterated its call.1 78 On Decem-
ber 15, 1979, the International Court of Justice issued an order
demanding the release of the hostages.17 9 The court pointed out
that "a dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises
and the detention of internationally protected persons, and
involves the interpretation or application of multilateral conven-
tions codifying the international law governing diplomatic and
consular relations, is one which by its very nature falls within
international jurisdiction."'" The case was before the World
Court despite Iran's refusal to cooperate with the International
Court of Justice and the United Nations."1 Because the case
was presented to different bodies of the United Nations, it was
argued that the United States did not have a right to use military
force to rescue the hostages.8
Judge Lachs, in a separate opinion, stated that the United
States, "having instituted proceedings, is precluded from taking
unilateral action, military or otherwise, as if no case is pend-
177. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran (Hostage
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ing. ' 18 3  The International Court of Justice did not agree. It
assessed the rescue mission as moderate and did not attempt to
outlaw it. The Court's only criticism was that the United States
may have inflamed the situation, and defied the court's earlier
order:
[Ain operation undertaken in those circumstances, from
whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect
for the judicial process in international relations; and to recall
that in paragraph 47, 1 B, of its Order of 15 December 1979 the
Court had indicated that no action was to be taken by either
party which might aggravate the tension between the two
countries.84
The critical question was whether the hostages were in
imminent danger of being executed.185 The environment in
Tehran and the Iranian government's threatening posture were
decisive factors in the U.S. determination that rescue measures
were appropriate. The timing was regarded as unimportant.
[Tihe State whose nationals are in peril must be given latitude
to determine whether a rescue action is necessary; there is no
international body or third party in a position to make that
judgment. The rescue action cannot therefore be characterized
as illegal under international law. Whether it was wise in a
political and military sense is a different matter."'
In sum, a state has the right to rescue its nationals immediate-
ly after their lives are endangered. An obscure threat, however,
does not constitute endangerment. An actual attack-or at least
an apparent threat where attack is imminent with no time to
negotiate-must have occurred. A state may use force while its
nationals are in danger when its use of force is the last resort.
Because the world community is always very sensitive about the
use of force, a state should do its best to show that all reasonable
peaceful measures have been exhausted, leaving force as the final
alternative. 1"'
In some circumstances, resort to other options may be fruitless
or inefficient. For example, the atrocities may be proceeding so
183. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. at 48.
184. Id at 43.
185. See Schachter, supra note 47, at 147.
186. Id
187. See Stuesser, supra note 31, at 31.
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rapidly that any delay, no matter how brief, may result in tremen-
dous casualties.
C. Exhaustion of Peaceful Measures
A related problem is that of striking a balance between the
use of force and peaceful means of settlement. Obviously,
peaceful means are preferable, and every state is obligated to seek
redress through such measures. Article 2 of the U.N. Charter
provides that "all members shall settle their international dis-
putes, ' 188 and Article 33 requires that member states actively
utilize peaceful means to settle any dispute likely to endanger
international peace."s On the other hand, the prevailing view
among international lawyers is that, in the absence of a special
agreement, states have no international legal obligation to settle,
or even attempt to settle, their disputes. In particular, absent
special agreement, a state has no international legal obligation to
submit a dispute with another state to impartial arbitral or judicial
settlement. t
g°
Any categorical answer to the choice between using force and
seeking redress through peaceful means is unwarranted.'91 De-
spite a general trend in international law toward peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, states are not obligated to exhaust peaceful
means before resorting to forceful rescue of nationals. In a
particular situation, a state should carefully balance all pros and
cons of different means and choose the most efficient way to save
its nationals' lives abroad. Different circumstances may dictate a
variety of solutions. Ultimately, the state must decide whether to
resort to force, negotiate, or use other peaceful means of settle-
ment.
D. Preference for Collective Measures
Among the peaceful alternatives to the use of force, one of
the most critical is collective measures. Collective measures are
generally preferable to unilateral action. They are more likely to
succeed, and their legality is unlikely to be questioned, especially
188. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 3.
189. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 903 cmt. e, reporter's note 3 (1986).
191. See Schachter, supra note 47, at 152.
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by the United Nations. "Collective intervention therefore, in
general, possesses a legitimacy which is normally denied to
unilateral intervention.""2 International institutions, however,
historically reflect numerous inefficiencies and failures. Therefore,
the invading state must use its best efforts to gain support from the
world community by exercising all possible peaceful means.
"The U.N. Charter embodies the expectation that, where
possible, Member states will use collective security measures to
avoid unilateral use of force."193 In principle, the U.N. resolution
is always preferable to unilateral actions. Unfortunately, interna-
tional institutions often do not perform according to their original
intent, and member states need them to be more effective.
Even in the Cold War's aftermath, the United Nations still is
not an efficient mechanism to end human rights violations.
Moreover, the United Nations has been an extremely ineffective
law enforcement mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that states
would rely heavily on the United Nations. They will continue to
use force unilaterally. This unfortunate reality should not over-
shadow the fact that U.N. members must use best efforts to engage
the U.N.'s collective forces. The Persian Gulf war is a perfect
example of the U.N.'s potential.
Unfortunately, regional organizations have also been ineffec-
tive. It is unlikely that there is a single example of a regional
organization's action stopping large-scale atrocities. In orchestrat-
ing the Grenada invasion, the United States clearly did not invoke
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
Given the unfortunate fact that nations cannot rely on
multinational efforts, there will be many unilateral interventions.
Nevertheless, their best efforts should be used to engineer
multinational actions.
E. Humanitarian Purposes
The intervening states' motives are particularly important. To
constitute humanitarian intervention, these motives should be
genuinely humanitarian. The intervening state should not use
humanitarian motives as a cover for ousting the target state's
192. Evan Luard, Collective Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 158
(Hedley Bull ed., 1985).
193. The Use of Armed Force in International Affairs: The Case of Panama, in 47 THE
RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 666 (1992).
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government or for other non-humanitarian ends. For example,
with respect to the Congo operation, the State Department
declared: "This operation is humanitarian-not military. It is
designed to avoid bloodshed-not to engage the rebel forces in
combat. Its purpose is to accomplish its task quickly and with-
draw-not to seize or hold territory."194  Such declarations
support the argument that the intervention was genuinely humani-
tarian.
How can the mission's humanitarian purpose be reconciled
with the violation of a state's territorial integrity? A rescue
mission's main purpose is not to violate territorial integrity or
political independence, but to protect nationals endangered abroad
and secure a minimum international standard of human rights.195
For example, in the Entebbe situation, it was not Israel's main
purpose to violate Uganda's territorial integrity. The mission was
in response to inhuman behavior and intended to liberate Israeli
nationals held hostage. Therefore, the temporary and limited
breach of Uganda's territorial integrity was justified.1 96 The U.N.
Charter usually prohibits such a violation of territorial integrity or
political independence regardless of the grievance under which it
arose.197  Nevertheless, the action was permitted due to the
extraordinary circumstances of this specific case and because of the
well-established, albeit narrow, right to use force to protect
nationals endangered abroad.1 98
Interestingly enough, some highly regarded lawyers argue that
there was no violation of Uganda's territorial integrity or political
independence.' 99 One commentator stated that "Israel could
plausibly argue that in the circumstances its raid at Entebbe was
not a use of force against the political independence or territorial
integrity of Uganda, or in any other way contrary to any purpose
of the United Nations."'  In addition, two other commentators
wrote that "the action of the Israelis could not possibly have had
194. United States Cooperates With Belgium in Rescue of Hostages From the Congo, 51
DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 14, 1964, at 838, 842 [hereinafter United States Cooperates With
Belgium].
195. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 98, at 247.
196. See Protection of Human Rights, supra note 152, at 150-51.
197. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
198. Id.
199. See HENKIN, supra note 81, at 145; McDougal & Reisman, supra note 15.
200. HENKIN, supra note 81, at 145.
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the effect of threatening the territorial integrity or political
independence of Uganda.""2 1 If Israel's intention was other than
purely humanitarian, the world's reaction to the mission would
have been quite different.
F Proportionality
Proportionality is a fundamental component for determining
the legality of using force" and is closely linked to the necessity
of using force. In a letter to the British authorities, then-Secretary
of State Webster included a requirement of proportionality:
It will be for [Her Majesty's Government] to show that the local
authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the
moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United
States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the
act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by
that necessity, and kept clearly within it.
203
Proportionality limited the right to self-defense under classical
international law. Although not specifically mentioned in Article
51 of the U.N. Charter, the Charter strictly maintains proportional-
ity.2°4 The proportion of force used in relation to the danger
deserves significant consideration when drawing the line between
lawful self-defense and illegal reprisals. Illegal reprisals "consist of
action in response to a prior unlawful military attack, aimed not at
defending oneself against an attack as it happens, but rather in
delivering a message of deterrence against the initial attack being
repeated."2 5 In 1974, Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush
wrote:
The United States has supported and supports the foregoing
principle [a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the
use of force]. Of course we recognize that the practice of States
is not always consistent with this principle and that it may some-
201. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 15.
202. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 391 (1993).
203. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 663-64 (Louis Henkin et al.
eds., 1987).
204. See Beyerlin, supra note 5, at 213.
205. Higgins, supra note 163, at 308. "Reprisals would necessarily involve a violation
of Article 2(4) ... and, not being self-defence are not brought within the permissive use
of force in Article 51." Id.
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times be difficult to distinguish the exercise of proportionate
self-defense from an act of reprisal."
Proportionality, as well as necessity, has another practical impor-
tance. According to the International Court of Justice, a state's
use of force can still be unlawful, even though it complies with the
canons of necessity and proportionality.2' Yet, if this activity is
not necessary and proportionate, "this may constitute an additional
ground of wrongfulness."2 °'
Even though it is difficult to define, proportionality is an
important question of fact.2 °" Proportionality "requires function-
al reference to all the various factors relating to the opponent's
allegedly aggressive coercion ... which together comprise a
detailed context."21 Traditionally, the Security Council consid-
ered this detailed context in a narrow scope limited to the immedi-
ate attack that led to the state response. In this context, the
U.N.'s negative response to the Grenada invasion demonstrated
the world community's intention to limit self-defense and forbid it
to be an instrument of intervention. The main cause of such a
negative response was that, despite virtually unanimous consensus
that only a short-term use of armed force is justified, the U.S.
military forces remained in Grenada for nearly two months, long
after those Americans who wished to be evacuated had left.211
The lesson to be learned from the Grenada invasion is simple: the
measures taken should be strictly confined to the purposes of
protection and, in particular, military forces should not remain
after exercising their protective function.
The numerous fatalities and actual threat to U.S. citizens
rendered the invasion in Panama problematic. Despite the serious-
ness of the Panama situation, it did not warrant launching a full-
scale invasion, eventually consisting of 12,000 American soldiers.
This military attack was not proportional and resulted in the death
of 26 Americans and over 700 Panamanians, mostly civilians.212
206. Arthur W. Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 720, 736 (1974) (emphasis added).
207. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 122 (Jan. 10).
208. Id.
209. See Stuesser, supra note 31, at 37.
210. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 78, at 243.
211. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 379.
212. See Ved Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 497 (1990).
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In addition, severe and widespread physical devastation, property
damage, and dislocation resulted.213
Nevertheless, it is plausible to argue that if more soldiers are
sent to the battlefield, fewer fatalities may occur. In a contempo-
rary war, the preparation of the military force may be the deciding
factor. Therefore, it is conceivable that if fewer soldiers were used
in the Panama invasion, there may have been many more casual-
ties.
In comparison to the Panama invasion, Israel's response in the
Entebbe incident was meticulously proportional. The United
States specified that the right to protect nationals abroad, "flowing
from the right of self-defense, is limited to such use of force as is
necessary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals from
injury.
214
In this statement, the United States emphasized that its right
to protect nationals abroad was limited and must adhere to certain
standards. In 1976, this approach was also highlighted in the Legal
Adviser of the Department of State's internal memorandum to the
Secretary of State regarding this incident:
The Israeli military action was apparently limited to the sole
objective of extricating the passengers and crew, and terminated
when that objective was accomplished. The force employed
seems reasonably justifiable as necessary for the rescue of the
passengers and crew: the killing of terrorists themselves for
obvious reasons; the firing on Ugandan troops because they
involved themselves in the conflict; and the destruction of
Ugandan aircraft to eliminate the possibility of pursuit of the
Israeli force. 5
Because this operation was carefully strategized, only three
hostages, one Israeli commando, seven terrorists, and some
Ugandan soldiers were killed.216
With respect to the Congo operation, commentators have
specifically made this same point. "Personnel engaged are under
orders to use force only in their own defense or in the defense of
213. Id
214. Protection of Human Rights, supra note 152, at 150.
215. Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 122, 123 (1979) (emphasis added).
216. United Nations: Security Council Debate and Draft Resolutions Concerning the
Operation to Rescue Hijacked Hostages at the Entebbe Airport, Aug. 5, 1976, 15 I.L.M.
1224.
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the foreign or Congolese civilians. They will depart from the scene
as soon as their evacuation mission is accomplished." '217
The foregoing examples reemphasize the essence of propor-
tionality. To be proportionate, a state's response should be
"limited in intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary
promptly to secure the permissible objectives of self-defense.
218
Because a rescue mission aims to protect nationals' lives abroad,
the proportional amount of force in such cases is that required to
protect. The military operation should limit its scope to protecting
lives and preventing future attacks. On the other hand, it should
not be too restrictive. In principle:
[The rescue operation may allow] a state to retaliate beyond the
immediate area of attack, when that state has sufficient reason
to expect a continuation of attacks (with substantial military
weapons) from the same source. Such action would not be
"anticipatory" because prior attacks occurred; nor would it be
a "reprisal" since its prime motive would be protective, not
punitive . ... Thus, "defensive retaliation" may be justified
when a state has good reason to expect a series of attacks from
the same source and such retaliation serves as a deterrent or
protective action.219
A state undertaking a rescue mission should be careful to
avoid civilian casualties. A commitment to save human lives
should not be transformed into a brutal massacre of civilians. A
state has an obligation to balance possible civilian casualties
against the threat to nationals' lives.
Proportionality plays an important role in distinguishing
genuine humanitarian intervention from abuses. As noted, actions
of a state in self-defense should be proportionate to the attack.
The same is true for humanitarian interventions. If an intervening
state delays the evacuation of its soldiers after an invasion, this
delay may indicate that the action has transcended the confines of
appropriate humanitarian intervention. The world community
generally views such activity with suspicion. Similarly, if an
intervening state uses many more soldiers than necessary to stop
a massacre, the world community may doubt the sincerity of the
state's humanitarian motives.
217. United States Cooperates With Belgium, supra note 194, at 842.
218. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 78, at 242.
219. Schachter, supra note 149, at 1638.
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IX. THE POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE
Opponents of humanitarian intervention frequently use the
possibility of abuse to support their position against intervention.
TWo such opponents argue that interventions for allegedly humani-
tarian purposes were a guise that "'permitted' outside powers to
invade sovereign states for all sorts of spurious reasons, but
primarily to prevent the indigenous populace changing the religion,
or, especially, the socio-economic systems imposed by their govern-
ments. ', 220  Many countries are concerned that they are more
likely to be a humanitarian intervention target than an intervening
state exercising a right to humanitarian intervention. 22' Another
commentator presented humanitarian intervention as "simply a
cloak of legality for the use of brute force by a powerful state
against a weaker one, and experience has shown how readily more
powerful states have used the pretext of a higher good to impose
their will and values on weaker states.,
222
Such violations and abuses pervade the history of international
relations. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has often
been used to achieve unlawful and criminal ends.22  Opponents
of humanitarian intervention argue that "a rule of non-intervention
commends itself to us because the contrary rule so readily falls
prey to cynical manipulation., 224  There is another side to this
argument. Even when humanitarian intervention is undertaken for
proper ends and is relatively successful, it may cost too much in
terms of human lives, injuries, and disruptions of normal life.225
The fact that the use of force for humanitarian purposes is
susceptible to abuse or may lead to casualties is too important to
ignore. In the contemporary world, it is too dangerous to provide
some governments with an instrument that allows them to circum-
220. Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 277-78.
221. R. George Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 FL.
INT'L L.J. 435 (1989).
222. Id. (citing Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian -
Ugandan Conflict "Humanitarian Intervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 859,
860 (1981)); Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 107 YALE J.
INT'L L. 291, 294 (1985).
223. See BROWNLIE, supra note 164, at 370. "[N]o genuine case of humanitarian
intervention has occurred, with the possible exception of the occupation of Syria in 1860
and 1861." Id.
224. Milner S. Ball, Ironies of Intervention, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 313, 314 (1983).
225. See Wright, supra note 221, at 440.
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vent conventional means of peaceful dispute settlement and
increase their capacity to violate international law. Self-defense
could become an avenue for serious international law violations
just as freedom of speech, a cornerstone of democratic values, has
been used as a pretext to justify racial or national superiority.
Nevertheless, the potential for abuse and wrongdoing is not
sufficient to compel rejecting humanitarian intervention. Even
lawful and well-justified rules can be abused.226 The potential for
abuse is "common to all legal policy, doctrine or rule." '227
The possibility of abuse of humanitarian intervention should
not obscure the fact that a potential wrongdoer can usually find
many other suitable excuses and pretexts. Although Adolph Hitler
relied upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in his
unconvincing attempt to legitimize annexing Poland and Czecho-
slovakia, nothing would have deterred him from using another
pretext if the doctrine of humanitarian intervention had been
unavailable.22  Hitler would simply have found another false
justification for invasion. The harm still would have occurred.229
"Foreign policy is too intricate a topic to suffer any total
taboos.""2  On the other hand, humanitarian interventions
"should not be allowed to become a regular and routine feature of
the governmental process, cast in the concrete of unquestioned
habit and institutionalized bureaucracy." 1  To prevent abuse,
the foregoing criteria may be a useful guide to appraise an act's
lawfulness.
X. AGGREGATE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
Thus far, the analysis has focused on arguments concerning
the legality of humanitarian intervention. Although there are
numerous arguments favoring both sides, it is no longer conceiv-
able to deny a state's right to use military force for humanitarian
ends in extraordinary circumstances. In the final analysis, all
arguments turn on the aggregate consequences of humanitarian
226. See id at 442.
227. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 78, at 416.
228. Wright, supra note 221, at 443.
229. See Bazyler, supra note 6, at 584.
230. George F. Kennan, Morality and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF. 205,214 (1985/86).
231. Idt
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intervention. It is a difficult issue with no clear answer because
there are seldom simple answers in international relations, and it
is practically impossible to anticipate all possible consequences.
The following list of possible humanitarian intervention conse-
quences is not exhaustive and is open to amendment and expan-
sion. Nevertheless, prohibiting humanitarian intervention would
not change the path of international relations. Most importantly,
it would not prevent states from employing military force for
humanitarian ends. At the very least, however, legalizing humani-
tarian intervention may make tyrants feel sufficiently threatened
to change their approach to human rights.
The following list proposes aggregate consequences if humani-
tarian intervention is legalized ("action") and if it is not legalized
("inaction"):
ACTION INACTION




2. The United Nations
would not be consid-
ered a measure of last
resort and faith in its
ability to deal with
human rights abuses
would be reinstated.
3. Tyrants would feel
threatened.









2. The efficiency of interna-
tional organizations would
continue to be questioned.
3. Tyrants would feel safe in
their abuse of human
rights.
4. Human rights abuses may
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INACTION
5. Governments would
attempt to prevent mas-
sive and outrageous
violations of human
rights to avert likely
humanitarian interven-
tions.
6. Human lives would be
saved.
7. Humanitarian interven-
tions would rarely be
necessary.
8. The possibility of inter-
national sanctions or
pressure would deter
many states from using
force. If the world
community considers
action in a given situa-
tion to be reprehensible,




would be relatively im-
portant.
9. Even the most powerful
states would not be im-
mune from censure.
10. The faith in human
rights and international
protection of human
rights would be reaf-
firmed.
5. Powerful states would use
human rights violations as
a pretext for humanitarian
intervention less frequent-
ly.
6. Human lives would be
lost.
7. Humanitarian interven-
tions would rarely occur.




tions would continue to
scrutinize state practices.
10. The faith in human rights
and international protec-
tion of human rights
would not be reaffirmed.
ACTION
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XI. CONCLUSION
This Article does not offer a new approach to using force for
humanitarian purposes; however, based on the foregoing, it may
be concluded that rescuing nationals abroad through military
coercion is a lawful exercise of a right to self-defense, provided
that this right is discharged in accordance with the aforementioned
criteria. The legality of such a right is less clear with respect to
humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, if force is employed
according to the aforementioned guidelines, the world community
will be more likely to consider it favorably.

